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   1 
Abstract 
Prior work has modeled individuals’ migration and remittance behavior separately, and reported 
mixed empirical support for various remittance motivations. This study offers an integrated 
approach, and considers migration as a mechanism for selection in a censored probit model of 
remittance behavior. This approach leads to different conclusions about the determinants of 
remittance behavior in the Thai internal migration setting. To the extent that these determinants 
capture different remittance motivations, as prior research has presumed, the analysis also 
provides varying support for these motivations. These results suggest that migration and 
remittance behavior are interrelated, and it is crucial for an analysis of remittance behavior to 
control for the selectivity of migration.  
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1. Introduction 
International remittances, funds and goods sent by migrants to origin countries, have reached 240 
billion US$ annually, becoming the second largest source of external finance for the developing 
world after foreign direct investment (Ratha and Xu 2008). Remittances from internal migrants, 
although smaller in magnitude, also comprise a vital component of rural livelihoods in many 
developing countries (Reardon 1997; Rempel and Lobdell 1978). Research shows that 
remittances relax budget or credit constraints in origin households (Lauby and Stark 1988; Lucas 
and Stark 1985; Stark and Levhari 1982; Taylor 1999) and provide opportunities for income 
redistribution and poverty reduction in origin communities or countries (Durand et al. 1996a; 
Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996b; Jones 1998; Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Russell 1986; 
Taylor et al. 1996). To anticipate the macro-level consequences of these flows, we first need to 
understand the micro-level motives shaping individuals’ remittance behavior. 
 
Prior research has provided various motives to explain why migrants remit. The altruistic motive 
suggests that migrants remit to improve their households’ welfare (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; 
Banerjee 1984; Johnson and Whitelaw 1974; Lillard and Willis 1997). The exchange motive 
implies that migrants remit to buy services or to secure future inheritances from households (Cox 
1987; Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998; de la Briere et al. 2002; Hoddinott 1994; Sana 2005). The 
insurance motive attributes remittances to a mutual risk diversification arrangement between the 
migrant and the household (Rosenzweig 1988; Stark and Levhari 1982), while the investment 
motive views remittances as a repayment for past loans from the household (Ahlburg and Brown 
1998; Cai 2003; Lucas and Stark 1985; Poirine 1997; Stark and Bloom 1985).  
   3 
Empirical studies to date yielded inconsistencies in attributing migrants’ remittance behavior to 
altruistic, exchange, insurance or investment motives. These inconsistencies can be connected to 
two major issues. First, because different remittance motives carry similar empirical 
implications, it is difficult to discriminate among alternative explanations. Second, because 
remittances are observed for migrants, a non-random subset of the population, the determinants 
of remitting are often confounded with the selection process into the migrant sample.
1  
 
This study seeks to address both issues. First, drawing on recent work by Rapoport and Docquier 
(2006), I employ a unified theoretical framework and combine empirical predictions from 
various remittance motives. Following the conventional approach in the literature, I first study 
migrants alone, and test these empirical predictions in an isolated probit model of remittance 
behavior in rural Thailand. This setting provides a rich source of information from almost 12,000 
individuals in 22 rural villages, about a fifth of whom have migrated to major urban destinations. 
Second, I compare the results from the isolated analysis to those from an integrated analysis of 
migration and remittance behavior. This analysis treats migration as a mechanism for selection in 
a censored probit model of remittance behavior and manages the selection bias that may have 
confounded empirical results in prior work. 
 
Compared to an isolated analysis of remittances, the selection-corrected model leads to different 
conclusions about the determinants of remittance behavior in the Thai setting. To the extent that 
these determinants capture different remittance motivations, as presumed in prior work and 
                                                 
1 The inconsistencies in findings can also be attributed to differences in context or data. Carling (2008) notes that 
differences in the migration context, family structure and societal norms may account for the variance in remittance 
motives across settings. Similarly, Rapoport and Docquier (2006) argue that the nature of data (e.g., cross-sectional 
versus longitudinal) can determine the extent of evidence for various remittance motives.   4 
summarized in Rapoport and Docquier (2006), the analysis also provides varying support for 
these motivations.  
 
These findings suggest that migration and remittance behavior are connected, and any analysis of 
remittances should consider the selectivity of migration. The findings also demonstrate the value 
of the theoretical framework in Rapoport and Docquier (2006), which, combined with the 
selection-corrected model suggested here, may help us reconcile the mixed empirical results in 
the literature and accumulate coherent and comparable findings about remittance behavior from 
various settings. 
 
2. Background 
Prior research has suggested a number of competing models that relate remittance behavior to 
altruistic, exchange, insurance or investment motives
2. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) recently 
reviewed this literature and outlined the assumptions and predictions of various models. Drawing 
on their unifying framework, below, I briefly describe each model of remittance behavior, state 
its main predictions, and refer to the empirical work supporting it.
3 To aid the exposition, in 
Table 1, I summarize the predictions from the four models.
4 Each column corresponds to a 
                                                 
2 Many of the key studies on remittance motivations relied on data from internal (often urban-to-rural) remittances. 
Lucas and Stark (1985) tested altruistic and self-interested motives to remit with data from internal migrants in 
Bostwana. Hoddinott (1994) found evidence of investment and inheritance-seeking hypotheses among urban 
migrants in western Kenya. VanWey (2004) compared the prevalence of altruistic and contractual remittance 
behavior among men and women in a sample of internal migrants in Thailand. Indeed, as Carling (2008, p.581) 
noted in his recent review, “Research on the determinants of remittances continues to be heavily influenced by a few 
studies of internal migration in developing countries in the 1980s.” The underlying assumption in the literature, then, 
is that similar behavioral models govern internal and international remittance flows. 
3 These predictions relate various factors to the amount of remittances. Due to limitations of the Thai data (described 
in note 8), in this study, I focus on whether migrants remit or not, rather than how much they remit. To model the 
remittance amount, one can apply the standard Heckman procedure: a probit model of migration followed by an 
OLS model of the remittance amount (assigning zero remittances to nonremitting migrants). 
4 This table is based on Docquier and Rapoport’s (2006) Table 2 (p.39), but differs in three respects. First, I do not 
report the predictions related to the strategic motive of remittances. This motive suggests that migrants’ remittances   5 
specific model and each row lists an explanatory factor (and its proxy in the Thai data, explained 
in detail in a subsequent section). Each cell displays the expected effect of a factor on the 
probability (or amount) of remittances. Distinctive predictions are indicated in square brackets. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Table 1. Overview of the Empirical Predictions of Remittance Theories] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In an altruistic model of remittances, a migrant’s utility function includes the utility of other 
household members. The migrant remits to improve his or her household’s, and as a consequence 
his or her own, welfare (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Banerjee 1984; Johnson and Whitelaw 
1974; Lillard and Willis 1997). The altruistic model sets forth a number of key predictions. First, 
remittances increase with (i) migrants’ income in destination (Cox 1987; Cox et al. 1998; Lucas 
and Stark 1985). Second, remittances decrease with (ii) migrants’ distance to origin and (iii) 
migrants’ duration of stay in destination (Funkhouser 1995). These predictions are attributed to 
declining altruistic inclinations of migrants who are farther and have been away longer
5. Third, 
remittances increase with the increasing economic needs of the origin household, captured, for 
example, by (iv) the number of dependents in the household and (v) the risks to household’s 
income (Lucas and Stark 1985; Massey and Basem 1992). Fourth, remittances decrease with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
are targeted at positively selecting future migrants. The specific empirical predictions of this model, for example, 
that remittances will “bribe” unskilled migrants in origin, are not testable with the Thai data. Second, I do not report 
the predictions for the inheritance motive for remittances. This motive implies that migrants remit to assure future 
inheritances from the household in origin. The predictions of this model are a subset of those of the exchange model, 
therefore, I include the inheritance-seeking motive within this more general model. Third and finally, I do not 
indicate relationships that are ambiguous or non-existent. 
5 The predictions follow from Funkhouser’s (1995) formal model, which set up a migrant’s utility to include the 
utility of the origin household. In the empirical application of this model, Funkhouser (1995) argued that a migrant 
who is farther, and has been away longer, would value his or her own utility more than that of the remaining 
household members, and reduce the frequency or amount of remittances. Although several studies report a decline in 
remittances with increased distance to origin and duration in destination (e.g.,Durand et al. 1996a; Lowell and de la 
Garza 2002), they typically attribute these patterns to migrants’ reduced intentions to return, rather than their 
diminished altruistic inclinations. The former explanation is considered in the exchange motive, where a migrant 
who is farther away is presumed less likely to return, and less likely to send remittances to bargain for inheritances.   6 
alternative economic resources available to a household such as (vi) a higher income in origin, or 
(vii) multiple migrants in destination (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Funkhouser 1995; Massey 
and Basem 1992). 
   
In an exchange model of remittances, a migrant remits to buy services, or to secure future 
inheritances, from other household members (Cox 1987). This model predicts that remittances 
increase with (i) the amount of inheritable assets in the origin household, and are higher if (ii) 
the migrant is a potential heir. Remittances are also higher in (iii) the presence of other migrants 
from the same household, as migrants use these transfers to compete for inheritances (de la 
Briere et al. 2002; Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; VanWey 2004). Similar to the 
altruistic model, the exchange model predicts that remittances increase with (iv) the number of 
dependents in households, but attributes this pattern to a payment for dependents’ care rather 
than migrants’ altruistic inclinations (Lee, Parish and Willis 1994). Also consistent with the 
altruistic model, the exchange model expects remittances to increase with (v) migrants’ income, 
but to decrease with (vi) migrants’ distance to the origin. The former relationship is based on the 
ability of higher-earning migrants to pay for services (e.g., taking care of assets or children) in 
origin. The latter rests on the assumption that farther-away migrants are less likely to return, and 
hence, less likely to bargain for inheritances with remittances. Different than any other model, 
the exchange model implies that remittances are lower for (vii) highly educated migrants as these 
migrants are less likely to return home, and thus, less likely to expect services or inheritances 
from other members of the household.  
   7 
The insurance model views remittances as a part of a mutual risk diversification arrangement 
between the migrant and the household (Rosenzweig 1988; Stark 1991; Stark and Levhari 1982). 
Because the migrant typically works in a different region, and in a different sector of the 
economy, his or her earnings provide a hedge against the risks to household’s earnings in origin, 
and vice versa. The insurance model distinctly predicts that remittances increase with (i) risks to 
migrants’ earnings in destination. Similar to the altruistic model, this model implies that 
remittances increase with (ii) risks to households’ earnings in origin (Agarwal and Horowitz 
2002; Cox et al. 1998; de la Briere et al. 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Lucas and Stark 
1985).  
 
The investment model views remittances as a repayment for household’s investment in the 
migrant, for example, in terms of loans to cover costs of education or migration (Cox and 
Jimenez 1990; Poirine 1997). Thus, the model implies that remittances increase with (i) 
migrants’ education and (ii) migrants’ distance to origin, proxies for costs of education and 
moving to destination, respectively. These predictions, which are specific to the investment 
model, have been supported empirically in various settings (Ahlburg and Brown 1998; Cai 2003; 
Cox et al. 1998; Hoddinott 1994; Lillard and Willis 1997; Lucas and Stark 1985; Regmi and 
Tisdell 2002). Another prediction, common also to the altruistic and insurance models, suggests 
that remittances increase with (iii) risks to household’s income in origin, which create higher 
incentives to invest in migration. A final prediction, consistent also with the altruistic and 
exchange models, states that remittances increase with (iv) migrants’ income in destination.  
   8 
As presented in Table 1, the four models, which suggest different underlying motives for 
remitting, share several common predictions. Yet, the models make a number of distinctive, and 
at times opposing, predictions (shown in square brackets), which allow us to discriminate 
between different explanations of remittance behavior in the Thai setting.  
 
A number of researchers have tested the predictions of multiple remittance models in different 
settings. Lucas and Stark (1985), the pioneers in this respect, found evidence for the exchange, 
insurance and investment models in Bostwana. Cox et al. (1998) showed the relevance of the 
exchange rather than the altruistic model in Peru. Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) declared 
empirical support for the altruistic rather than the insurance model in Guyana. Similar to de la 
Briere et al. (2002) in the Dominican Republic, VanWey (2004) found evidence for the exchange 
and insurance models in Thailand. Regmi and Tisdell (2002) showed support for the exchange 
and investment motives in Nepal. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) provided evidence for the 
altruistic and insurance models in Pakistan and India.  
 
The present study builds on this prior work, and uses Rapoport and Docquier’s (2006) unified 
framework to test the predictions from four models of remittance behavior in the Thai setting. 
Different than prior work, the study also considers the confounding effect of migrant selectivity. 
In particular, because remittance behavior is only observed for migrants, a non-random segment 
of the population, the determinants of remitting are often confounded with the selection process 
into the migrant sample. 
   9 
Few studies to date have considered migrant selectivity in testing models of remittance behavior. 
Using a small sample of 215 Kenyan households, Hoddinott (1994) was first to employ a 
Heckman two-stage model of remittances to control for migrant selectivity. Funkhouser (1995) 
replicated this approach with data from Nicaragua and El Salvador. In recent work, Taylor, 
Rozelle and de Brauw (2003) and Mora (2005) applied the same model to the cases of China and 
Mexico, respectively.  
 
The present study builds on the empirical approach of these studies, and presents an integrated 
analysis of migration and remittance behavior. This analysis takes into account migrant 
selectivity, and alters our conclusions about the determinants of remittance behavior in Thailand, 
a setting described in detail below.  
 
3.  Study Setting 
In Thailand, earlier flows out of rural areas consisted mostly of seasonal migrants, who sought to 
supplement their farm earnings for a few months during droughts that precede the monsoon rains 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1996). This seasonal character started to change in the 1980s. From the 
mid-1980s to mid-1990s, Thailand experienced a steep economic growth, averaging 9 percent 
per year, due mostly to an increase in export manufacturing (Jansen 1997). This growth created 
demand for labor in urban centers like Bangkok (Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996). Much of this 
labor was supplied by rural migrants from the Northeastern part of the country, the region for 
this study (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995; Mills 1997).  
   10 
This period of expansive growth came to an end in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the export growth 
dropped from over 20 percent to zero, due to increasing competition from China and India. In 
1997, the Asian financial crisis hit Thailand, which was followed by a devaluation of the Thai 
currency, baht, and a brief recession. Unemployment rates increased as a result and rural-urban 
migration flows began to slow down. Our data capture this boom and bust period of the Thai 
economy, leading to dramatic changes in migration and remittance flows between rural and 
urban regions.  
 
3.1. Data 
The data come from the three waves (1984, 1994, and 2000) of a longitudinal survey conducted 
in the Nang Rong district in the historically poor Northeast region of Thailand.
6 The 1984 wave 
was a census of 51 villages and included information on individual demographics, household 
assets and village characteristics. The 1994 wave replicated the 1984 census, following all 1984 
respondents still living in the original 51 villages and adding any new residents, and also 
contained a retrospective life history component that recorded migration, education and labor 
experiences of all 13 to 35 year-old individuals from age 13 onward. The 1994 wave located and 
surveyed migrants (who were absent at the time of the village survey) in four major destinations 
(the provincial capital, Buriram; the regional capital, Korat or Nakhon Ratchasima; Bangkok and 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Area; and Eastern Seaboard provinces), reaching 70 percent of 
eligible migrants from 22 of the original 51 villages (Rindfuss et al. 2007).
7 The final 2000 
                                                 
6 The Nang Rong surveys are conducted by the University of North Carolina and Mahidol University in Thailand.  
The data and information about the surveys are available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/nangrong/. 
7 I considered the potential bias due to individuals lost to follow-up. Using an alternative sample from household 
rosters, which contained information on all migrants based on remaining household members’ reports, I re-estimated 
the three migration-remittance models in Table 4. All conclusions remained identical except that the exchange 
model received less support in one indicator (land ownership) in the Heckman estimation with the expanded sample.   11 
survey replicated the 1994 wave, following the 1994 respondents and adding any new residents 
to the database, and similarly contained a life history as well as a migrant follow-up, component.  
 
Prior research suggested that the full data set from 51 villages does not accurately capture urban 
migration flows due to missing information from absent migrants (Curran et al. 2005; Garip and 
Curran 2010). Thus, the present study restricts the analysis to data from 22 villages where 
migrants were followed-up in four major destinations. The data for the study combine 
information from the household rosters, life history surveys and village questionnaires. 
Specifically, in addition to collecting basic demographic information, the 1994 and 2000 
household rosters asked each individual about their migration and remittance behavior in the past 
12 months. These questions are used to compute the dependent variables for our analysis. The 
life history surveys in 1994 and 2000 collected retrospective information on annual migration 
trips, which allow us to compute accumulated migration experience indicators at the individual, 
household and village level. Finally, the village questionnaires in 1994 and 2000 recorded 
various village characteristics, which are included as controls. Additional macroeconomic 
indicators, such as unemployment rates, are obtained from the Thai National Statistics Office.  
 
3.2. Operational Measures 
The dependent variables for this study are two binary indicators of migration and remittance 
behavior. Migrants are defined as individuals who were members of their households in 1984 
(1994), but moved out of the village two months or more prior to the 1994 (2000) survey. 
Remitters are defined as migrants who sent money or goods (food, clothing, household items,   12 
electrical appliances or vehicles) to their households during the 12 months preceding the survey 
(as reported by the household members in origin).
8  
 
The following variables, listed in the first column of Table 1, capture the key predictions of the 
altruistic, exchange, insurance and investment models of remittance behavior in the Thai data. 
Binary indicators for advanced, secondary and primary schooling measure education. Dummy 
variables indicating whether a person is the youngest daughter, older daughter or son capture that 
person’s heir status. In a traditional Thai household, the youngest daughter, who often cares for 
her parents, is the most likely heir. Older daughters are second in line, while sons, who typically 
move into their wife’s household, are the last.  
 
Occupation serves as a proxy for migrant’s income.
9 In Thailand, factory jobs pay the highest 
salaries on average, followed by service and construction jobs.
10 The unemployment rate in a 
migrant’s occupation captures the risks to his or her income. The duration of a migrant’s last trip 
provides a measure of his or her degree of separation from the household. The distance of 
                                                 
8 The Nang Rong data also record the amount of remittances, however, this information may be unreliable. I 
conducted fieldwork in the region in 2005 and observed that most migrants were reluctant to reveal how much 
remittances they sent. Talking to village leaders, I learned that individuals had strong incentives to hide their income 
in order to qualify for need-based loans from the Million Baht fund (a discretionary fund of approximately 25,000 
US$ given to each village by the government). Therefore, in this study, I take a conservative approach and focus on 
the remittance decision rather than the amount.  
9 The data put students and unemployed into the same occupational category, which, combined with farmers, 
constitute the reference group in our analysis. Students and unemployed individuals are included in the sample as a 
considerable share of them migrated (18%) and sent remittances (9%). A number of scholars suggested that 
remittance theories are applicable to this group. VanWey (2004) compared the altruistic and contractual models of 
remittances in the Nang Rong data and included the students and unemployed in her sample. Piotrowski (2006) 
studied the effect of social networks on remittances with the Nang Rong data and also included the students and 
unemployed in his analysis. Similarly, Adams (1989) analyzed the impact of remittances on inequality in Egypt, and 
relied on a sample containing student migrants. The literature thus justifies the inclusion of the student and 
unemployed category in analysis, but our key results are also robust to its exclusion (results available upon request). 
10 According to Thailand National Statistics Office (Labor Force Survey, Table 7), manufacturing occupations paid 
5,870 baht/month on average in 2007. The average wages for service workers (employed in private households or 
hotels/restaurants) and construction workers were 5012 baht/month and 4,715 baht/month respectively.   13 
migrant’s destination to origin is captured roughly with two dummy indicators for Bangkok or 
Central Provinces (both about 350 km from Nang Rong) and Northeastern Provinces (about 100 
km). The indicator of whether an individual has a child (<15 years old) in the origin household, 
the total number of children (of women younger than 30) and number of seniors (older than 64) 
capture the degree of dependency in the household. For each migrant, the number of other 
migrants from the household captures the degree of competition for future inheritances, or the 
amount of alternative economic resources available to the household. In its former 
operationalization, the variable tests a prediction of the exchange model, while in the latter one, 
it captures a relationship identified by the altruistic model. 
 
Land and cattle, the major household assets in rural Thailand, are lagged to prevent endogeneity 
with migration and remittance decisions. For both variables, the 2000 (1994) values come from 
the 1994 (1984) household survey. Prior work identified a nonlinear effect of household assets 
on migration and remittance propensities in the Thai setting (VanWey 2003; VanWey 2004). To 
capture this pattern, I create four categories of land ownership (no land, 1-14 rai, 14-31 rai, and 
more than 31 rai; a rai is approximately 0.4 acre) and use the logarithm of cattle owned. Along 
with land and cattle, the indicators for the number of household members in a non-agricultural 
occupation (excluding the index individual)
11 and the number of economic activities (silk 
weaving, silk worm raising, other cloth weaving, charcoal making), also lagged, proxy a 
household’s income.
12  
                                                 
11 Non-agricultural occupations include wage positions (e.g., factory or construction worker, teacher, government 
official) as well as entrepreneurial activities (e.g., shop owner or street vendor), and typically provide higher 
earnings than agricultural work (e.g., harvesting for pay). 
12 Lagging the wealth (or income) indicators does not solve the endogeneity problem if current migration decisions 
are correlated with past migration, which affect household wealth in the past, or if there are omitted variables related 
to both wealth and migration. To test if this is the case, I perform a procedure suggested by (Spencer and Berk 
1981). I estimate a model of wealth (for each of the land, cattle, household members in a non-agricultural occupation   14 
The months of water shortage in a year capture the duration of the droughts, which limit 
agricultural activities and thus pose a risk to the origin household’s subsistence or income. (Most 
agricultural activities are subsistence-oriented.) The presence of a school in the village and the 
years since the village was electrified both measure the level of development, and thus, the 
amount of opportunities for investment in the origin village.  
 
Age, marital status, and household size, added as controls, capture basic demographic 
information. (Sex is already accounted for with the binary indicators for youngest daughter, older 
daughter or son.) An indicator for migration trips by the individual (obtained from life history 
data) measures prior migration experiences, which increase the propensities to re-migrate. 
Indicators for migration trips by household members and villagers (aggregated from individual-
level data) capture the higher likelihood of migration from households and villages with an 
established history of migration (Garip 2008; Garip and Curran 2010). Proportion of households 
that receive remittances (among those that have migrants) serves as a proxy for the collective 
remittance behavior in the village. Finally, a binary indicator for survey year (1994 or 2000) 
accounts for the change in migration and remitting behavior over time. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                                                                                                                             
and economic activities indicators) with exogenous regressors (rain shortages, which are likely to affect wealth and 
income). Then, in the migration equation, I add the residuals from the four wealth equations as extra regressors. The 
coefficients for the four regressors are jointly insignificant (F-statistic = 1.51, p = 0.20), and the null hypothesis that 
the wealth indicators are orthogonal to the errors cannot be rejected. I repeat this analysis for the remittance 
equation, and similarly find that the coefficients for the residuals are jointly insignificant (F-statistic = 0.49, p = 
0.75). These results suggest that the lagged wealth (and income) indicators can be treated as exogenous to current 
migration or remittance decisions. Crucially, this treatment does not preclude an association between wealth and 
past migration or remittances. But this link does not seem to bias our estimates of the effect of lagged wealth on 
migration or remittances.   15 
Table 2 displays means for all variables separately for the overall sample, subset of migrants and 
subset of remitters (among migrants) along with results from difference-of-means tests that 
compare migrants to non-migrants and remitters to non-remitters. (The means for non-migrants 
and non-remitters are not shown to conserve space.) Migrants, about 20 percent of the sample, 
differ significantly (p<0.05) from non-migrants in all variables but the indicators for youngest 
daughter and migrant trips in the village. Compared to non-migrants, migrants have higher 
education, are more likely to be sons rather than daughters, and are less likely to have children, 
but live in households with a higher total number of children, seniors and other migrants. 
Migrants also live in households that are wealthier in land and cattle, that have more members in 
a non-agricultural occupation, and that engage in a higher number of economic activities. 
Migrants are more likely to come from villages where rainfall has been scarce and development 
level is low as indicated by the lack of a school or few years since electrification. Migrants are 
typically younger than non-migrants, less likely to be married, and more likely to belong to 
larger households. Migrants are also more likely to have prior migration experience themselves, 
or to live in households where other members do. These comparisons suggest that migrants are a 
highly selective group in these rural communities, and thus support our intuition that an isolated 
analysis of remittance behavior in this group alone may lead to biased results.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Table 2. Sample Characteristics for the Overall Sample, Subset of Migrants and Subset of 
Remitters] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Remitters, about 70 percent of migrants, are also significantly different from non-remitters in 
many variables. Remitters are less likely to have advanced education, less likely to be sons, and   16 
consequently, more likely to be daughters compared to non-remitters. Remitters are more likely 
to be employed in higher paying factory jobs, and face a higher unemployment rate in 
destination. Migrants who remit typically spend a longer time away from origin, compared to 
those who do not, and live in a more distant destination (Bangkok or Central rather than 
Northeastern provinces). Remitters are more likely to have a child in origin, come from 
households that have a higher number of children, but lower number of seniors, and medium, 
rather than high or low, amounts of land. Remitters belong to households where more a higher 
number of members work in a non-agricultural occupation. Remitters are slightly younger than 
non-remitters, less likely to be married, and belong to smaller households. They have more prior 
migration experience and come from villages where a higher proportion of migrant households 
receive remittances. 
 
4. Analytic Strategy 
Let the migration and remittance decisions of an individual be represented by two binary 
dependent variables 
€ 
y1 and 
€ 
y2. Assume that both of these variables are generated by a probit 
equation such that: 
 
€ 
y1
* = x1β1 +ε1      (1) 
€ 
y2
* = x2β2 +ε2     (2) 
 
where 
€ 
y j
* are unobserved (latent) variables related to the binary dependent variables as follows:  
€ 
y j =
1   if  y j
* > 0
0  if  y j
* ≤ 0
⊧ 
⊨ 
⊪ 
⊩  ⊪ 
     j =1,2    (3)   17 
If we assume that the error terms 
€ 
ε1 and 
€ 
ε2 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
standard normal, the probability 
€ 
π j of observing a positive outcome is: 
€ 
π j = Φ(x jβ j)     (4) 
where 
€ 
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The inverse transformation of 
the above equation, which expresses the linear predictor as a function of the probability, gives 
rise to two probit models (for j=1,2). 
 
The conventional approach in the literature models remittances separately from migration using a 
probit model as in equation (2). A weakness of this approach is that it assumes a priori that the 
error terms from migration and remittance equations are uncorrelated. Yet, this assumption may 
be untenable if the unobserved factors that influence migration behavior are also related to the 
remittance outcome. In that case, migration process generates a non-random sample of 
individuals for observing remittances, and consequently, the standard probit estimation leads 
biased estimates. 
 
This issue of sample selection poses a serious methodological problem with potentially dramatic 
consequences for substantive conclusions. When a portion of the data is systematically excluded, 
both external and internal validity of the conclusions are threatened (Berk 1983). For example, 
imagine a community where only rich individuals can afford to migrate due to high costs of 
migrating, and all individuals are equally likely to remit once they migrate. If we estimate a 
model of remittances on a sample of migrants only, we will underestimate the effect of wealth, 
concluding that it is not important for remitting behavior. However, in the overall population, 
wealth is the most important characteristic influencing remittances, as it determines whether a   18 
person will be a migrant in the first place. Excluding non-migrants from our sample in this case 
will compromise the external validity of our conclusions.  
 
Internal validity is also vulnerable to sample selection even when researchers seek to make 
statements on the censored population alone, migrants in our case. Assume that families send 
more responsible sons or daughters as migrants, and these individuals are more likely to 
command greater earnings, and send remittances. This unobserved characteristic affects both 
migration and remittance behavior, and leads to biased conclusions about the latter, which is 
problematic even if one’s interest lies only on migrants (Berk 1983; Heckman 1979). 
 
We can account for the sample selection bias by employing a variant of Heckman’s (1979) two-
step selection model. Because in our case both the selection and outcome equations have binary 
dependent variables, we end up with a censored bivariate probit specification which has 
previously been used by Boyes, Hoffman and Low (1989), Dubin and Rivers (1989), Reed 
(2000), and van de Ven and van Praag (1981). Note that if the two equations are indeed 
correlated, this specification corrects for sample selection bias in the remittance equation. 
Conversely, if there is no correlation, then this procedure is identical to estimating the two 
equations separately. By observing the magnitude and significance of the correlation term, we 
can determine whether sample selection indeed biases our results.
13  
                                                 
13 In the classical Heckman (1979) example, one observes wages for women who are employed. Employed women 
constitute a nonrandom sample, if, for example, more productive women self-select into employment based on their 
higher expectations about wages. In that case, focusing on the censored sample alone leads us to overestimate the 
wages in the overall population. One can extend this analogy to remittances: more productive individuals may self-
select into migration behavior based on their expectations about earnings in destination, and consequently, their 
potential for sending remittances to origin. But one can also imagine the opposite situation, where less productive 
individuals self-select into migration due to the lack of opportunities in origin. The first case of positive selection 
leads us to overestimate remittances in the overall population, and the second case of negative selection leads us to   19 
 
The censored bivariate probit model employs the same structure displayed in (1)-(2), but 
recognizes that 
€ 
y2 is observed only if 
€ 
y1 =1, and that error terms 
€ 
ε1,ε2 ( ) may have a non-zero 
correlation (ρ). This specification leads to the following log-likelihood function for sample of N 
observations (Meng and Schmidt 1985; van de Ven and van Praag 1981): 
 
€ 
lnL = yi1yi2lnΦ2(zi1,zi2,ρ)+ yi1(1− yi2)ln[Φ(zi1)−Φ2(zi1,zi2,ρ)]+ (1− yi1)ln[1−Φ(zi1)] { }
i=1
N
∑         (5) 
where 
€ 
Φ2 is the standard bivariate normal distribution function, 
€ 
Φ is the standard normal 
distribution function and 
€ 
zij = xijβ j. Note that the first and second terms on the right-hand side 
relate to migrants that remit and do not remit respectively. The third term relates to the censored 
individuals that do not become migrants.  
 
4.1. Using Geographic Variation as an Instrument for Migration 
To manage a censored sample, the Heckman model calls for an independent variable that 
influences migration (selection), but does not directly affect remittances (outcome), nor is it 
correlated with the unobservables affecting remittances. This variable, known as an instrument or 
an exclusion restriction, is included in the migration equation, but can be legitimately excluded 
from the remittance equation. Although an instrument is not strictly required, if the set of 
regressors are identical for the selection and outcome equations, the identification is obtained 
solely through the nonlinear functional form of selection (Little 1985) and the estimation is poor 
due to high multicollinearity (Achen 1986; Berk 1983). 
                                                                                                                                                             
underestimate them. By observing the sign and magnitude of the correlation term (rho), we can assess the 
plausibility of each scenario.   20 
 
Few studies have used the Heckman specification to correct for migrant selectivity in a model of 
remittance behavior. These studies either did not specify an instrument (e.g., Funkhouser 1995; 
Hoddinott 1994), or used one without proper empirical justification. In the latter group, Taylor et 
al. (2003) and Mora (2005), for example, both used an indicator for community migration 
prevalence to satisfy the exclusion restriction. But, migration prevalence is likely to be related to 
other factors, such as development level or income opportunities in a community, which may 
also affect remittance behavior. Since there is no attempt to discard such possibilities, it is not 
clear that the identification is credible in these applications.  
 
Environmental or geographic variables have been used as instruments in various applications, 
based on the underlying assumption that individuals have no control over the characteristics of 
the region in which they live in (Moffitt 2003). In the Thai case, the distance to the district 
center, Nang Rong, to which migrants need to travel to reach urban destinations, may be a 
potential instrument.
14 Individuals who live in a village far from the district face higher travel 
costs, and thus may have lower propensities to migrate especially if their families have limited 
financial resources.
15 
 
                                                 
14 One objection to distance as an instrument is that omitted characteristics may be related to both residential choices 
and subsequent migration decisions. Distance, in that case, may not be assumed exogenous to migration behavior. 
Two analyses consider this possibility. The first introduces village-level indicators to the migration model (the 
proportion of households growing cassava and sugar cane - the crops that create agricultural jobs – and the presence 
of a nearby factory) capturing the conditions that may have attracted settlers to a village initially, and may have 
affected their migration decisions later on. The second analysis estimates the migration model on a sample of 
individuals born in their village of residence (who, as a result, have not chosen that residence area themselves). The 
estimated effect of distance on migration remains robust in both analyses (results available upon request), which 
provide no evidence against the assumption that distance is an exogenous determinant of migration. 
15 Individuals’ proximity to the final destination (e.g., Bangkok) is a more accurate measure of travel costs. But this 
measure is only available for migrants, therefore, cannot be used as an instrument for the migration decision.   21 
4.2. Establishing the Relevance of Time to District as an Instrument 
To check this basic insight, I employ a descriptive analysis suggested by Card (1993). I split the 
22 villages into two equal groups based on the time it takes to get to the Nang Rong district. A 
village is considered ‘far’ if it takes 45 minutes or more to Nang Rong, and ‘close’ otherwise. I 
fit a probit model of migration behavior to a subset of individuals who live in far villages. This 
model includes all the independent variables used in later analysis, but deliberately excludes the 
indicator for time to district. Thus, I try to attribute the migration behavior of individuals in far 
villages, who, presumably, are at a disadvantage, to other variables, balancing the scales against 
finding an independent effect of time to district. Using the estimates from this model, I compute 
predicted migration probabilities for the whole sample, and divide the sample into four groups 
based on the quartiles of the predicted migration probabilities.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Figure 1. Odds Ratio of Migrating in Close vs. Far Villages across Quartiles of Predicted 
Migration Probabilities] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
For each quartile, Figure 1 plots the odds ratio of migrating in close versus far villages. Odds 
ratio is defined as  
) 1 (
) 1 (
F F
C C
p p
p p
−
−
      (6) 
where  C p and  F p  are the proportion of migrants in the close and far villages respectively.  
 
In the lowest quartile of predicted migration, for individuals in close villages, the odds of 
migration are 3 times as large as those in far villages. In the three higher quartiles, by contrast, 
distance to district has a modest effect. In the second quartile, for example, the odds ratio is 1.6, 
meaning that for individuals who live close to the district the odds of migration are 60 percent   22 
higher compared to those who live farther. In the third and fourth quartiles, the odds ratio drops 
to 1.3 and 1.1 respectively, suggesting a smaller advantage for individuals in close villages over 
those in far ones. These patterns suggest that time to district has a significant effect on migration, 
and this effect is most pronounced for individuals with the lowest propensities to migrate. As an 
alternative check for instrument validity, I tested for weak instruments by excluding the distance 
indicators from the migration model. The resulting F-statistic was 14.11(df = 11.913), more than 
the lower bound of 10 required to reject the hypothesis of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 
1997). 
 
4.3. Establishing the Exogeneity of Time to District as an Instrument 
For time to district to serve as a legitimate instrument, it must influence individuals’ migration 
propensities, but exert no direct effect on their remittance behavior. While the former condition 
of relevance is easily demonstrated, as in the analysis above, the latter condition of exogeneity is 
not directly testable. Following a strategy used by Card (1993), however, we can establish its 
feasibility.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Table 3. Estimated Marginal Effect of Time to District on Migration and Remittances] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 presents estimates from five probit models of migration and remittance behavior. 
Column (1) shows the marginal effects of time to district (in hours) and its squared term on the 
propensity to migrate. The results suggest a nonlinear pattern. The likelihood of migration is 
higher in villages that are at a middle-range distance from the district (and highest in villages that 
are about 45 minutes away) compared to those that are very near. This pattern, observed in other 
settings as well (Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln 2009), is attributable to commuters:   23 
individuals living close to the district can commute to work instead of having to migrate to an 
urban destination. Column (2) shows the marginal effects for the distance indicators when 
demographic, household and village characteristics are controlled for. The effects become 
slightly smaller compared to those in the first column, but retain their sign and significance.  
 
Columns (3)-(5) show the marginal effects for the distance indicators in three probit models that 
gradually introduce controls. In all specifications, the marginal effects remain small and 
insignificant. Distance to district does not seem to affect remittance behavior directly. This result 
is consistent with the qualitative observations from my fieldwork in the region.
16 In particular, 
the majority of the migrants (n=52) and household members (n=58) in my sample indicated 
sending or receiving remittances via postal services.  Given this pattern, one does not expect 
distance to directly affect remittance behavior, as confirmed by the results in Table 3. These 
results, however, are not sufficient to claim that distance is exogenous to remittances. 
Specifically, distance, if correlated with the unobserved determinants of remittance behavior, 
may still influence this behavior indirectly (which may not be observed when examining direct 
correlations). For example, distance may be correlated with the frequency of visits home, which 
may influence migrants’ likelihood of remitting. Or, distance to district may be associated with 
having better institutions in the village, which may in turn be correlated with the propensity to 
remit. To take these patterns into account, I included a measure of migrants’ trips to destination, 
which also captures the number of trips back home. I also included indicators for village 
                                                 
16 I conducted 24 focus group interviews, with the participation of 158 individuals, in 8 of the 22 Nang Rong survey 
villages in November 2005. In each village, I consulted with village headmen to identify potential participants for 
three focus groups: (1) village leaders (village headman and village committee members), (2) migrant sending 
household members, and (3) return migrants. Focus groups consisted of six to eight participants, typically equal 
number of men and women, who discussed the motivations for, and the consequences of, migration and remittance 
behavior.   24 
institutions, like temples or factories, which obtained insignificant marginal effects across all 
specifications (not shown). These indicators captured some of the pathways (other than 
migration) through which distance to district and remittances may be correlated, but there may 
be others we do not account for. To consider this possibility, which cannot be discarded entirely, 
I employ an alternative specification.  
 
4.4. An Alternative Specification 
If distance to district indeed proxies costs of migrating, and not the unobservable factors related 
to remittance behavior, its effect should be less detrimental on the migration propensities of 
individuals who live in wealthier households. Thus, an interaction between distance and 
household wealth should exert a significant effect on the propensity to migrate. Using this 
interaction term as an instrument, we can include distance in both migration and remittances 
models, and thus relax the assumption that distance is exogenous to remittances. The maintained 
assumption is that the direct effect of distance on remittances does not vary by households’ 
wealth status.  The results from this alternative specification (available upon request) are similar 
to those from one where distance alone is the instrument. The latter results are discussed in detail 
below.  
 
5. Results  
Table 4 displays the estimates from three empirical specifications to model migration and 
remittance behavior: (i) a probit model of migration, (ii) a probit model of remittances estimated 
on a sample of migrants (isolated approach) and (iii) a censored probit model of migration and   25 
remittances estimated on the entire sample (integrated approach).
17  The goal is to establish 
whether the integrated model of remittances, which takes into account migrant selectivity, 
changes our conclusions about the determinants of remittance behavior in the Thai setting. (In 
both the probit and censored probit models of remittances, I present the marginal effect of each 
indicator on the conditional probability of remitting given migration. Using the latter model, one 
could also compute the marginal effects of the indicators on the joint probability of migrating 
and remitting.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Table 4. Estimated Marginal Effects of Individual, Household and Village Characteristics on 
Migration and Remittances] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5.1. Migration 
The first column in Table 4 presents the marginal effects estimated in the migration model. 
 In 
Thailand, higher paying factory jobs require a high school diploma. As a result, individuals with 
secondary or advanced education in our sample are more likely to migrate compared to those 
with primary education or less. The adult children in the household have a higher propensity to 
migrate compared to other members of the household. Among the adult children, older daughters 
and sons are more likely to migrate than the youngest daughters, who are often responsible for 
caring for their parents in their old age. 
 
In Thai families, parents often live with their adult children and take on the task of raising their 
grandchildren. Thus, in our sample, while having a child decreases the odds of migration, the 
number of seniors increases the likelihood that an individual will migrate. The total number of 
young children in the household has no effect on migration. Having other migrants in the 
                                                 
17 In all models, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level.   26 
household, who potentially provide information about or help with migrating, also increases an 
individual’s propensity to migrate.  
 
Compared to individuals in landless households, those living in households with moderate 
amounts of land (1-14 rai or 14-31 rai) are more likely to migrate. This nonlinear pattern, 
observed in other settings as well (Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994), suggests that migrants 
belong to households that are sufficiently wealthy to afford the costs of migration, but not so 
wealthy to find migration unattractive. Individuals’ likelihood of migrating decreases with the 
log of cattle their household owns potentially because cattle ownership signifies employment 
opportunities, as well as a form of wealth, in the origin, which provide an alternative to 
migration (VanWey 2003). 
 
Individuals’ propensity to migrate does not change with the household’s income, measured 
roughly with the number of members in a non-agricultural occupation and the number of 
economic activities, but increases with the risks to that income, proxied by the months of water 
shortage. Individuals are less likely to migrate if their village has a school, but more likely to 
migrate if their village is a moderate distance from the district, as explained in detail above. 
 
Propensity to migrate increases with age, but decreases with its squared term (reaching its 
maximum at the age of 24), is lower for married individuals, but higher for those living in large 
households. The likelihood of migration increases with the prior migration trips of an individual 
and also with the prior trips of the members of his or her household or village, who provide the 
information or support required for migrating. Finally, the likelihood of migration is lower in   27 
2000, compared to 1994, reflecting the declining rural-urban flows in Thailand in the aftermath 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
 
5.2. Remittances 
The marginal effects described above characterize the selectivity of rural-urban migration in 
Thailand. The remaining analysis describes the implications of this selectivity for the 
determinants of remittances. I begin with the estimates from the probit model (isolated approach) 
displayed in the second column, and then compare those to the estimates from the selectivity-
corrected Heckman model (integrated approach) displayed in the third column. (In the latter 
model, I present the marginal effects of each indicator on the conditional probability of remitting 
given migration.) In the censored probit model, we present the marginal effects of each indicator 
on the conditional probability of remitting given migration. Put differently, we evaluate the) 
 
In interpreting these results, similar to prior work (Rapoport and Docquier 2006), I assume the 
following: (i) an estimate provides evidence for a theory if it is both statistically significant and 
has a sign consistent with a prediction of that theory (displayed in Table 1); (ii) an estimate 
provides evidence against a theory if it is significant, but has a sign opposite to that expected in 
that theory; (iii) an estimate provides no evidence for or against a theory if it is not significant. 
Comparing the relative magnitude of the standardized estimates, I evaluate the relative strength 
of the evidence for (or against) each theory. 
 
In the probit model, the propensity to remit decreases with education, and is higher for the 
daughters compared to the other members of the household. These patterns provide distinctive   28 
evidence for the exchange model which attributes a higher likelihood of remittances to migrants 
who are less educated, hence more likely to return to the origin, and to those who are heirs to 
future inheritances, the daughters in the Thai case. 
 
The propensity to remit is highest for migrants in factory jobs, followed by those in construction 
or service, compared to farmers, students or unemployed. These categories are roughly in 
descending order of income. Thus, migrants with a higher income are more likely to remit in the 
Thai setting confirming a prediction shared by the altruistic, exchange and investment models.  
 
The likelihood of remitting declines with the unemployment rate in destination. This pattern 
contradicts a distinct prediction of the insurance model, which attributes a higher likelihood of 
remitting to migrants who face risks to their income in destination. Thus, the pattern provides 
evidence against the insurance model. 
 
The propensity to remit increases with migrants’ length of stay in destination, contradicting a 
prediction of the altruistic model, which expects declining remittances from migrants who have 
been away longer. The pattern thus provides evidence against the altruistic model.  
 
Migrants in Bangkok or Central provinces, which are about 350 km to Nang Rong, are more 
likely to remit than those in more proximate locations. This pattern provides evidence for the 
investment model, which distinctly predicts higher remittances from migrants in farther away 
locations, presumably, due to higher costs borne by families of those migrants to finance the 
migration.   29 
 
Migrants with a child in the origin are more likely to remit. This finding provides evidence for 
the exchange model, which posits remittances to be a repayment for the childcare services 
received in the origin, and also for the altruistic model, which expects remittances to increase 
with the increasing economic needs of the origin household.  
 
Other patterns identified with control variables are as follows: The likelihood of remitting 
increases with age, but decreases with its squared term (peaking at the age of 32) and is lower for 
married individuals. The likelihood of remitting increases with the proportion of migrants who 
remit in the village and is higher in 2000 compared to 1994.  
 
A number of these patterns, shown in boldface in the third column of Table 4, change in the 
integrated approach, which uses a Heckman specification to correct for migrant selectivity. First, 
migrants’ education, which decreases the propensity to remit in the probit model, has no 
significant effect in the Heckman model. Thus, the pattern, which provides evidence for the 
exchange model in an isolated analysis of remittances, disappears in the integrated analysis of 
migration and remittances.  
 
Second, migrants’ duration in destination, which increases their propensity to remit in the probit 
model, is not significant in the Heckman estimates. As a result, the evidence against the altruistic 
model, significant in the isolated approach, is absent in the integrated one. Third, migrants’ 
distance to origin, which increases their likelihood of remitting according to the probit estimates,   30 
has no effect in the Heckman model. The evidence for the investment model, suggested by the 
isolated analysis, once again, disappears in the integrated analysis.  
 
Fourth, having a child in the origin household, which increases the probability of remitting in the 
probit model, has no significant effect in the Heckman specification. The former pattern, taken as 
evidence for both the altruistic and exchange motives in the isolated analysis, disappears in the 
integrated analysis. 
 
Fifth, the number of migrants in the household, which has no effect on the probability of 
remitting in the probit model, has a positive effect in the Heckman model. Similarly, having 
moderate amounts of land (1-14 rai or 14-31 rai), which has no effect on remittances in the probit 
model, obtain positive marginal effects in the Heckman estimates. Compared to the isolated 
approach, as a result, the integrated analysis provides stronger evidence for the exchange model, 
which predicts a higher likelihood of remittances in the presence of inheritable assets, such as 
land, or other migrants from the same household, who might be competing for these assets.  
 
Sixth, and finally, the estimate of rho (ρ), the correlation between the errors of the migration and 
remittance equations, which is assumed to be zero in the isolated probit model, is positive 
(0.622) and statistically significant (p<0.05) in the selection-corrected Heckman model. 
Substantively, the positive sign suggests that the unobserved factors that increase individuals’ 
propensity to migrate also increase their prospects for sending remittances. Statistically, the 
significant estimate establishes that migration and remittance behavior are correlated in the Thai   31 
setting. Ignoring this correlation, as in the isolated model of remittances, leads to biased 
conclusions about the determinants of remittance behavior.  
 
Comparing the relative magnitude of the statistically significant marginal effects in the selection-
corrected model allows us to assess the relative strength of the support for each remittance 
theory. Among the binary measures, heir status indicators obtain the largest effects (0.197 for 
youngest daughter), followed by dummies for migrants’ occupation in destination (0.185 for 
factory worker) and land ownership in origin (0.059 for owning 1-14 rai of land). To compare 
the relative effects of binary and continuous measures, I use the marginal effect of a change in 
the latter from its minimum to maximum value. (The ordering is identical if I compare the 
marginal effect of a standard-deviation change in all indicators.) The unemployment rate obtains 
a marginal effect of -0.127 (=-0.045 x (3.51-0.71)), while the number of migrants in household 
has an effect of 0.167 (=0.028 x (6-0)).  Considering the relative magnitudes of these estimates, 
the evidence for the exchange motive (provided by all the above indicators) is the strongest, 
followed by the support for the investment model (suggested by the large and positive effect of 
higher-paying occupations). The evidence against the insurance model (given by the negative 
effect of the unemployment rate) is slightly smaller in magnitude. The evidence for the altruistic 
model (provided by the positive coefficients of higher-paying occupations) is comparable in 
magnitude to the evidence against that model (suggested by the positive coefficient of the 
number of migrants). 
6. Conclusion 
Most empirical work models migration and remittance behavior separately, treating them as 
independent processes. Because remittances are observed for migrants only, a non-random   32 
sample of the population, and the unobserved characteristics related to being a migrant are likely 
to also affect remittance behavior, the empirical estimates from prior studies may be subject to 
selection bias. To address this problem, this study proposes an integrated empirical approach, 
and models migration as a mechanism for selection in a censored bivariate probit specification of 
remittance behavior.  
 
Compared to an isolated analysis of remittances, the integrated approach leads to different 
conclusions about the determinants of remittance behavior in the Thai internal migration setting. 
To the extent that these determinants correspond to different remittance motivations, as 
presented in the unifying framework of Rapoport and Docquier (2006), the integrated analysis 
also alters the empirical evidence for and against each motivation.  
 
Specifically, in the Thai settings, by moving from an isolated analysis of remittances to an 
integrated one, (i) the evidence for the exchange motivation, where remittances are in return for 
assets or services migrants expect from households, becomes weaker in two indicators, but 
stronger in two others; (ii) the evidence for the investment motivation, where remittances are a 
repayment for past loans from households, disappears, as does (iii) the evidence both for and 
against the purely altruistic motivation for remittances.  
 
The patterns identified in the isolated and integrated models carry different macro-level 
implications. In the integrated analysis, the higher remittance propensity to households with 
moderate land (compared to the landless) provides support for the exchange motivation. This 
pattern, not detected in the isolated analysis, implies a potential shift in the distribution of   33 
income or wealth in the origin community. In particular, remittance flows to households with 
moderate land is likely to allow these households to acquire more land, and approach the level of 
the wealthiest. But this equalizing effect is counteracted by the growing gap between the 
moderate-land households and the landless, potentially further marginalizing the latter, and 
leading to a more unequal overall distribution of wealth in the origin community. In recent work, 
Garip (2012) compared household wealth data from 1994 and 2000 household rosters in the 
Nang Rong data, and found evidence for the former, equalizing, effect of remittances. 
 
In sum, the findings suggest that migration and remittance behavior are interrelated, and any 
analysis of remittance behavior should control for the selectivity of migration. The findings also 
suggest that the mixed empirical results on remittance behavior in the literature may be 
attributable, at least partially, to a failure to control for migrant selectivity. Using the empirical 
strategy described here, and the unified theoretical framework provided by Rapoport and 
Docquier (2006), future research can control for the differential selectivity in different contexts, 
and consider the empirical predictions from multiple theories of remittance behavior. This new 
direction may allow us to accumulate coherent and comparable findings about remittance 
behavior from various settings.     34 
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Figure 1. Odds Ratio of Migrating in Close vs. Far Villages across Quartiles of Predicted 
Migration Probabilities 
 
 
 
 